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15.1 Introduction 
The international tax law literature has sought for the enforcement of the new international tax order, 
which placed the Base Erosion and Profits Shifting (BEPS) project as its notable trait. The project 
presupposed that the international tax framework at that time was unable to adapt to the business 
developments inherent in the integration of national economies and markets.1 
Meanwhile, Lepsius’2 studies showed that within the last 20 years, the case law of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court on the protection of basic rights has been largely influenced by tax law. The 
reason consists in the fact that taxes – in particular, direct taxes – have become tools for the most 
frequent and proliferated infringements on individuals’ basic rights, particularly the right to property.3 
These infringements are of unprecedented risks to occur especially within the new international tax 
order, which culminates in the conclusion of the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty 
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (hereinafter referred to as the MLI).4 
By adopting its norms into existing Double Tax Convention (DTC), the MLI has found its way to 
penetrate into domestic tax laws. Proportionate tax laws are necessary to ensure that the intrusion of 
states into the private spheres of individuals is justified.5 
Profound norm-reviewing powers rest within the judicial power, particularly the constitutional courts. 
Their scrutiny is necessary because the value of the MLI lies within its swift implementation in 
eliminating aggressive tax planning. Consequently, conformity of the norms with the constitutions is 
relatively left out from discussions. In order to prevent ultra vires taxes, such conformity should be 
verified through constitutionality review. 
If a (ratified) MLI is declared in line with the Constitution, then the government’s decision to adopt 
the MLI may actually improve taxpayers’ compliance. On the contrary, when the MLI is declared 
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unconstitutional, then the government will have a strong legal basis to amend its commitment to the 
MLI. The extent to which the review takes place, though, is dependent upon the legal traditions and 
the type of basic rights vested in the constitutions. A basic right protected in one state might not enjoy 
the same protection in another; likewise, a constitutional dispute in one state might fall short of 
attaining a locus standi in another. Also, the MLI may be declared unconstitutional in one state and 
constitutional in another. Thus, within the effort to harness the link between constitutional law and 
tax law, what are the requirements for an effective constitutionality review on the (ratified) MLI? 
15.2 Expounding the MLI as Object of Constitutionality Review 
As an international law instrument, the MLI is bound by the provisions of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Thus, it is subject to provisions on the application of 
successive treaties concerning the same subject matter laid down in Article 30 of the VCLT, and the 
general rule on the amendment of treaties governed in Article 39 of the VCLT. The Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) states:6 
The Convention operates to modify tax treaties between two or more Parties to the Convention. It will not function 
in the same way as an amending protocol to a single existing treaty, which would directly amend the text of the 
Covered Tax Agreement; instead, it will be applied alongside existing tax treaties, modifying their application in 
order to implement the BEPS measures. 
Contextually, the international tax law is governed primarily by a network of DTC comprising of 
circa 3,500 bilateral conventions,7 which derive their structures from model tax conventions 
developed by the OECD, the UN, or individual states (e.g. the U.S. Model Convention). These model 
conventions were at the heart of the BEPS project, the action plans of which were designed to close 
many loopholes found within the models on which taxpayers had been taking advantage. This effort 
was deemed to be inefficient as it meant that each and every existing DTC must have been amended. 
Thus, the MLI form was chosen, with the purview that its signatories may modify implementation of 
the DTC concluded among them simply by identifying a DTC as a ‘Covered Tax Agreement’. 
Being a set of norms, developed by an intergovernmental body such as the OECD, the MLI may be 
able to achieve its purposes to the extent that the representation of different states’ interests and 
traditions is sustained. In order to maintain and increase participation, the MLI provisions were 
formulated in a method that enable states to accept for or reserve against varieties of measures. Thus, 
states may be selective with regard to the MLI provisions they wish to adopt. 
15.2.1 Domestic Status of the MLI 
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In order for the MLI to be able to become an object of constitutionality review, it must initially attain 
domestic status. Conceptually, the domestic status of an international convention consists of domestic 
validity, domestic applicability, and rank.8 These matters and the general methods of transposition of 
the conventions into domestic law are prescribed in the domestic law itself. 
Traditionally, the validity of international conventions is influenced by the monist and dualist 
traditions. Within the former, provisions of an international convention are converted into domestic 
law without a due legislative act, whereas in the latter, obligations arising from international 
conventions must be implemented into domestic law through legislative act.9 Referring to the 
implementation of human right conventions and EU law, Viţă 10 reiterated that the monist-dualist 
concept has, however, become less relevant in the contemporary acceptance of international 
conventions. 
When validity is determined by a legislative act, the hierarchical order of the law (i.e. a Law or Bylaw) 
by which an international convention will have its domestic validity may affect the eligibility of the 
convention to be an object of constitutionality review. In Indonesia, a plea for constitutionality review 
can only be filed against a Law, which is jointly enacted by the president and parliament.11 
Meanwhile, the Law on International Convention governs that DTC signed by Indonesia falls within 
the category of convention which is ratified by a presidential regulation.12 
In any case, the attainment of domestic validity does not render an international convention applicable 
domestically. Sohn13 submitted that the relationship between domestic validity and domestic 
applicability of an international convention should be construed as that the former is a prerequisite in 
establishing the latter. This effectively rules out any interpretation by which an international 
convention could automatically acquire domestic validity if it has an expressed domestic applicability 
in its provisions.14 
The domestic applicability of the MLI must be placed against the peculiar background of the parallel 
nature of DTC and the MLI (i.e. the nature by which the MLI does not amend the texts of DTC, but 
rather affects the application of those texts). From a state’s perspective, the selected MLI provisions 
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are directly applicable to a number of covered DTC, the selection of which is also at the discretion of 
each state and its treaty partners. Thus, the MLI has only indirect applicability to domestic tax law. 
In turn, the covered DTC has direct applicability on domestic tax laws, particularly the income tax 
law. This view must be taken notwithstanding the parallel nature of both instruments, for it otherwise 
would render the MLI domestically inapplicable, at all. 
In terms of constitutional law, the parallel nature of DTC and the MLI raises a challenge as to which 
of the ratifying laws, of the – DTC or of the MLI – could become object of constitutionality review. 
Constitutionality review whether as an integral part of a constitutional complaint or as separate 
procedure, requires identification of the specific provision of the law to which the review will take 
place. Since the MLI only acquires indirect domestic applicability, a constitutional complaint against 
the application of an MLI provision could not completely disregard the DTC provision because its 
application is affected by the MLI. Thus, two different laws are affected. 
Even if an international convention has acquired both domestic validity and domestic applicability, 
the rank which the convention acquires within a state’s constitutional realm has brought about another 
challenge towards subjecting the MLI to constitutionality review. The issue stems from, again, the 
monist-dualist dichotomy, specifically concerning its use in defining the relationship between 
domestic and international laws. A monist state considers domestic and international laws belonging 
to the same legal order, whereas a dualist state draws a distinction between the laws by which the 
domestic legal status of the latter laws is to be determined by the former laws.15 The dichotomy fails 
to solve the issue of which of the two acquires higher rank. 
This brings the discussion to the primacy [of EU law] principle. The principle confers that ‘(…) the 
Treaties and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of 
Member States’.16 As an EU principle, the primacy principle enjoys – or suffers from – different level 
of acceptance by constitutional courts in EU Member States. In Romania, the EU laws take 
precedence over national laws, except for the Romanian Constitution.17 In Germany, in 2016, the 
Federal Constitutional Court held in particular that 
in principle, the precedence of application of Union law before national law also applies to conflicting national 
constitutional law (…) and as a rule, in case of conflict, leads to the national law being inapplicable in the specific 
case.18 
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In Belgium, the Constitution effectively remains the highest norm, for limits have been set as to the 
application of the primacy principle.19 
Disparities towards the acceptance level of the primacy principle must be seen against the background 
of the multilayered spectrum of human rights protection in the EU comprising of protection by 
national constitutions and by community-level conventions.20 Given the sphere in which 
constitutional courts must guard the constitutions, Komarek21 submitted three methods to balance the 
need of expanding constitutional democracy through European integration with that of maintaining 
the role of constitutional courts. First, the CJEU must end its practices of allowing national courts to 
safeguard the EU law which reduce the authority of constitutional courts.22 Second, constitutional 
courts must refrain themselves from being significantly submissive to EU law, for that law is 
complementary, rather than interchangeable, to the national constitution.23 Third, constitutional 
courts must refrain from being extremely resistant to EU law, for it could compromise the 
constitutional democracy throughout the EU.24 
The international tax law does not recognize a supranational court like the CJEU. The primacy of the 
MLI can, therefore, only be tested against the constitutional values of each signatory state. With 
signatories reaching 84 states,25 governments are incentivized to implement the MLI without due 
regard to the protection of taxpayers’ rights. Constitutionality reviews of the MLI must, therefore, be 
able to effectuate the protection of basic rights while upholding the governments’ constitutional 
mandate to administer tax affairs. 
15.2.2 Identification of Potential Infringements on Basic Rights 
The above considerations presuppose the widest scope of constitutionality review. However, there 
exist a wide range of types of constitutionality review: from a concrete form which takes into account 
facts regarding infringements of basic rights to an abstract constitutionality review. The latter type of 
review is, however, not always available. 
In any event, it is necessary for the constitutional court to perform a proportionality test between the 
norms formulated throughout the MLI, and the basic rights embedded in the constitution. The failure 
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of a state in fulfilling its budgetary functions often leads to investigation on tax avoidance and evasion 
allegedly committed by the taxpayers. In this regard, taxpayers have always been at the more 
vulnerable position in tax collection. 
Taxpayers cannot always rely on a charter of taxpayer’s rights. When a dispute arises, classic 
arguments such as ‘safeguarding revenue’ and ‘the need of effective fiscal supervision’ are often 
submitted by the governments as justification to any transgression of taxpayers’ rights. Meanwhile, 
a procedure by which a national court communicates with its constitutional court regarding the 
constitutionality of a tax norm is not always available. Thus, taxpayers who complain that their basic 
rights have been violated are urged to file constitutional complaint. 
While the right to property is of high relevance to tax matters, violations of other basic rights are not 
excluded. Depending on the scope of the right as established in the case law of the relevant 
constitutional courts, there may be other rights affected by the application of the MLI in a domestic 
legal system. For example, the MLI’s hybrid mismatches rule, which allows states to re-characterize 
corporate structure for tax purposes, may hinder a person in pursuing his freedom of association. 
Also, depending on the provisions of the constitution, protection of basic rights may also be warranted 
for legal persons, which are relevant to corporate taxpayers. 
15.2.2.1 Potential Infringements against the Right to Property 
The DTC and the MLI largely operate in respect of income tax collection, which upholds the ‘fruit 
and tree’ doctrine. This doctrine provides that the assets are the tree that generates the fruit, which is 
the income. One could argue that only the assets, and not the income, are considered property. The 
jurisprudence of the Canadian Tax Court in Prèvost suggests, however, that:26 
(…) It may well be … that when the terms ‘beneficial owner’, ‘beneficially owned’ or ‘beneficial ownership’ are 
used in the Act, it is either used in conjunction with property … but is never used in conjunction with the income 
which is derived from the property … However, dividends, whether coin or something else, are in and by 
themselves also property and are owned by someone. (emphasis added) 
The right to income is thus the right to property, the exercise of which is protected by the 
constitution.27 Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union determines the 
scope of the right as to include ownership, usage, disposal and bequeath of lawfully acquired 
possessions. The restrictions of the right are set by the law.28 One can be deprived of property if it is 
for the public good and entails fair compensation.29 
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Potential infringements by the MLI on the right to property include provisions which entail 
requirements on the possession of income-deriving assets and limitations on the entitlement to double 
taxation relief. These include provisions on the subject-to-tax requirement for transparent entities 
(Art. 3(1)); on the absence of double taxation relief in the case of unresolved dual tax residence (Art. 
4(1)) or different characterization of taxable income (Art. 5(1)); on the minimum holding period of 
dividend-entitling shares (Arts. 8(1) and 9(1)). 
The above provisions effectively limit the fashion by which a taxpayer could own, use, dispose and 
bequeath their assets. In practice, these provisions might become more dominant than they should be. 
The 365-day holding period laid down in Articles 8(1) and 9(1) of the MLI, for example, could deter 
a person from utilizing its funds for short-term investments or to make other business-reasoned 
judgments. Here, a constitutional complaint could be well founded. 
When a double taxation relief is rejected, a complaint might be objected to buy the argument that tax 
authorities are not constitutionally obliged to conclude DTC with all states in which taxpayers operate 
their businesses in order to eliminate double taxation suffered by those taxpayers. Nor do tax 
authorities have the obligation to eliminate it unilaterally under the domestic tax laws. Taxpayers may 
submit, however, that the absence of relief has resulted in excessive taxation. 
The rejection of double taxation relief may be brought before the constitutional courts, if it resulted 
from unresolved conflicts of qualification (Arts. 3(1) and 5(1)) and dual-residence conflicts (Art. 
4(1)). These conflicts have been addressed in the model DTC, specifically the OECD Model 
Convention (OECD MC), as well as in multiple reports issued by the OECD (e.g. the Partnership 
Report). While the rules laid down in these documents are not legally valid, they are of high practical 
significance in tax collection. While the above MLI provisions constitute a statutory limitation 
allowed by the constitution and consented to by the government, they may not represent the values 
of the people. 
15.2.2.2 Potential Infringements on Equality 
The MLI is a culmination of the BEPS project. BEPS itself refers to the ‘tax planning strategies that 
exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations where 
there is little or no economic activity’.30 The so-called ‘aggressive tax planning’ undermines 
the fairness and integrity of tax systems because businesses that operate across borders can use BEPS to gain a 
competitive advantage over enterprises that operate at a domestic level [and undermines the] voluntary compliance 
by all taxpayers.31 
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Unequal treatment by the governments may result from the MLI provisions on tax abuse, including 
the Principal Purpose Test (PPT) rule (Art. 7(1) and (4)), the Simplified Limitation on Benefits 
(SLoB) Provision (Art. 7(8), (9), (10), (11), (12), and (13)) and the rules concerning avoidance of 
permanent establishment status (Arts. 10, 12-14). The PPT rule, for example, includes a phrase by 
which DTC benefits32 may only be granted if 
it is reasonable to conclude, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances, that obtaining that benefit was 
one of the principal purposes of any arrangement or transaction that resulted directly or indirectly in that benefit. 
In the absence of a statutory definition of ‘principal purpose’, tax authorities may arbitrarily apply 
different de minimis rules in qualifying abusive practices. 
The tax authorities’ discretion to qualify and disqualify certain persons from DTC benefits are even 
made explicit in the SLoB Provision. While the requirements of persons qualifying for DTC benefits 
are restrictive as to set a minimum amount of share ownership (Art. 7(8) and (9) of the MLI), an 
unqualified person could, nonetheless, obtain DTC benefits by virtue of the rules laid down in the 
subsequent paragraphs (e.g. having an active conduct of business). Most strikingly, Article 7(12) of 
the MLI confers that such person could obtain DTC benefits if it 
demonstrates to the satisfaction of [the tax] authority that neither its establishment, acquisition or maintenance, 
nor the conduct of its operations, had as one of its principal purposes the obtaining of [DTC] benefits. 
Furthermore, the tax authorities’ freedom to curtail provisions in the MLI also leads to arbitrariness. 
The MLI rule on the avoidance of permanent establishment status effectively determines persons that 
may or may not be granted with DTC benefits, and can be decided jointly by different tax authorities 
(Art. 10(3) of the MLI). 
Discriminatory tax treatment has found justification on the grounds of residency of the taxpayers (i.e. 
a non-resident could be treated differently than a resident) and of the need to establish effective fiscal 
supervision (e.g. a non-resident could be denied of net calculation of income that is available for a 
resident). It is also not difficult to accept that tax laws should limit the possibility of taxpayers to 
conduct abusive tax practices. The potential breach of equality33 arises, however, from the tax 
authorities’ discretion to determine the consequences of arrangements made by the taxpayers. This is 
not to mention that, in counterbalancing the exemption made by one state, a state may be re-allocated 
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with taxing rights it previously surrendered when concluding DTC with its partner states (Art. 11 of 
the MLI). 
15.2.3 Establishing an Effective Constitutionality Review of the (Ratified) MLI 
The above considerations set up the grounds for a potential constitutional review of the MLI. In order 
to effectuate the review, engagement in judicial dialogues must be performed. Institutionally, this 
review is best performed by an independent judicial body with mandate to review the constitutionality 
of the laws. 
Historically, the 1937 Irish Constitution is claimed to be the first constitution prescribing the mandate 
to review the constitutionality of the laws, when common law states such as the United Kingdom, 
Australia and Canada did not.34 In Germany35 and Belgium,36 the mandate is prescribed for the 
Constitutional Court. In the United Kingdom, the tasks to interpret and implement, as to glean a sense 
of existence of, the constitution are performed by the U.K. Supreme Court; the mandate is not 
prescribed in the constitution, nor is it reserved for a certain judiciary power.37 Meanwhile, in 
Ethiopia, the mandate is prescribed within the constitution; but instead for the state’s judiciary power, 
it is prescribed for the House of Federation.38 
15.3 Balancing the Competing Interests within the (Ratified) MLI 
The MLI represents a coordinated, if not a harmonized, effort. Specifically, the MLI has adopted 
‘weak’ harmonization whereby norms are harmonized to the extent that states retain their rights to 
opt out on some of the provisions, and to legislate around the harmonized norms.39 This typology is 
accurate in describing the vagueness of the MLI provisions, which need further definition.40 
Meanwhile, as a product of intergovernmental cooperation, it goes without saying that the MLI pays 
little or no regard to the interests of the taxpayers. The paradigm upheld in formulating the MLI is 
completely different than that in formulating a DTC. Theoretically, a DTC is formulated in line with 
the traditional pluralist approach by which socio-economic interests of the people influence the 
                                                 
34  The Supreme Court of Ireland, A v Governor of Arbour Hill Prison [2006] 4 I.R. 88, 145-146. See also: Paul Gallagher, 
‘The Irish Constitution – its unique nature and the relevance of international jurisprudence’ (2010)45 Irish Jurist 22, 
30. 
35  The German Basic Law, Art. 93(1), The Act on the Federal Constitutional Court of § 13(6). 
36  The Belgian Special Act of 6 January 1989 on the Constitutional Court.  
37  Jo Eric Khushal Murkens, ‘Judicious review: the constitutional practice of the UK Supreme Court’, (2018) 77 
Cambridge Law Journal 349, 349. 
38  The Ethiopian Constitution, Art. 61. See also: K.I. Vibhute, ‘Non-judicial review in Ethiopia: constitutional paradigm, 
premise and precinct’, (2014) 22 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 120. 
39  Mark Humphery-Jenner, ‘The desirability of ‘weak’ form of legal harmonization: perspective from statutory 
interpretation and legal coherence’, (2012) 13 German Law Journal 807, 807. 
40  Mark Humphery-Jenner, supra 39, 807. 
governments’ decision-making process, although the decision resulted therefrom must somehow 
reflect the latter’s independence from the former.41 
Representation of different interest groups is evident within the provisions of the DTC. Its model 
affirms states’ commitment in avoiding double taxation on cross-border income accumulated by, inter 
alia, entrepreneurs, employees, pensioners, artists, sportsmen and professors. States also ensure that 
their taxpayers do not suffer from double taxation (Art. 23 of the OECD MC) and from discriminatory 
tax treatment (Art. 24 of the OECD MC). These characteristics cease to exist within the MLI and 
BEPS project. 
Without any deliberate protection expressed by their governments, taxpayers are vulnerable to abuse 
of basic rights. This means that a constitutionality review by an independent judicial body is necessary 
to balance the competing interests, although as a normative concept, balancing of competing interests 
requires normative judgment of various incommensurable values.42 
The plea for balancing becomes urgent, because the MLI, entered into force on 1 July 2018,43 is 
currently at a time in which states are contemplating on the methods by which their acceptance of the 
obligations arising from ratifying the instrument will be realized. This implies that breach of basic 
rights may soon be identified. Methodically, the act of balancing requires certain logical steps, 
namely: (a) ascribing a value to the interests in concern; (b) determining whether interests may be 
‘traded off’ pursuant to achieving other goals; (c) should the interests be tradable, deciding whether 
the intrusion against the superior interest is proportionate, considering the ‘stringency’ of the 
infringed interests: the more valuable the interests, the more stringent the test.44 
When balancing the competing interests within the (ratified) MLI, the courts’ openness to sound legal 
principles could turn out to be beneficial. The principle of ability to pay, for example, may be 
allocated with some weight when determining the existence of breach against the right to property. 
Other established legal principles include the freedom of contract, legal certainty and balanced 
allocation of taxing rights. Established rules and doctrines (e.g. the business judgment rule, the ultra 
vires doctrine) may also be referred to. 
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The act of balancing is essential to a constitutionality review. In practice, courts attempt to reconcile 
two conflicting interests by classifying them into a hierarchy.45 It stems from the principle of 
proportionality, by which the means adopted must be rational and the least restrictive in attaining the 
objective.46 
An effective balancing on the competing interests within the (ratified) MLI could be achieved in two 
ways. First, the scope of a basic right could be narrowed or expanded as to exclude or include the 
MLI provision on which the constitutionality tests are applied. This is achieved when the 
constitutionality review is performed as an integral part of a constitutional complaint. If a certain MLI 
norm is found to be in breach of the right to property, then the scope of protection of that right has 
been enlarged; vice versa, if it is found to be constitutional, then the scope has been restricted. 
The method in achieving the above result is definitional balancing, which aims at protecting the 
predictability and legitimate expectations by establishing categorical argumentative forms.47 The 
method also aims to define the abstract scope of individual right; thus, not only does it examine the 
factual circumstances of each individual case but also establishes exceptions against the categorical 
scope of individual rights.48 The method is also able to create rules for their addressees.49 Using this 
method, constitutionality of the MLI can initially be tested through constitutional complaint in order 
to establish whether a certain MLI provision has actually breached one’s basic rights. Reasoning 
found in the complaint could then undergo generalization in order to expand or narrow the scope of 
protection of the basic right in concern. For example, an MLI provision that has proven to have 
breached one’s right to property could be included within the scope of protection of the right to 
property, thus annulling the domestic law embedding the provision. 
Second, when constitutionality review is performed against the hypothetical outcome of a certain 
norm within the MLI, then the constitutional court may declare that norm to be valid or invalid, partly 
or in its entirety. Whichever is the outcome, it should be considered as reflecting the legal culture and 
values of a state. 
15.4 Engaging in Judicial Dialogues 
When performing the act of balancing between the competing interests within the MLI, constitutional 
courts or other independent body mandated with the task to review constitutionality of the law are 
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expected to rule on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the instrument, and when proper, to 
engage in a judicial dialogue. The dialogue refers to the cross-referencing [of reasoning or decision] 
between national or supranational courts, particularly with regard to common substantive mission 
(e.g. protection of human rights).50 Typically, a dialogue takes place between national courts with 
comparable status, such as constitutional courts (horizontal communication) or between national and 
supranational courts in the context of an international framework (vertical communication). It could 
also be a combination of both.51 
The engagement by constitutional courts in horizontal communications in respect of the MLI is 
necessary in order to determine and promote the reciprocal obligations arising from the instrument.52 
While reciprocal obligations are better formulated strict-harmonizing53 (e.g. EU law), a national court 
can, nonetheless, reassure itself that its decision will not worsen off the people and government of its 
state, relative to other states.54 Additionally, a judicial dialogue may serve as a ‘cross-fertilization’ 
process by which solutions to legal problems are collectively worked for.55 This is attained when a 
disseminating court casts its legal rules or principles, which are then caught by a listening court.56 For 
example, if an MLI provision is found to be unconstitutional in one court, then that state could 
disseminate its findings (e.g. through publications or conferences) in order for other courts to respond 
or unforcedly embeds those findings in their respective cases. 
Although the method is only persuasive, it has been extensively used in practice. According to 
Harding,57 comparative legal reasoning by way of citation of foreign laws has formed an integral part 
of the Canadian Supreme Court, to an extent where the descriptions on the use, relevance and value 
towards its jurisprudence are hardly visible. At some point, the amount of foreign law citation had 
even exceeded that of Canadian own jurisprudence.58 The Court, however, restricted its ascription to 
foreign cases as to merely providing ‘statements of principles’ from which a unique and genuine 
Canadian approach and solution will be shaped.59 
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Within the vast array of dialogues which take place between courts around the world, future judicial 
dialogues on the constitutionality of the (ratified) MLI are highly probable. Legal systems are 
stringent to their own culture; and a culture is absorbent to other cultures.60 Supposedly, the legal 
systems are also porous to each other. Contextually, the openness of the MLI to constitutionality 
reviews will ultimately draw a level playing field between the governments and the taxpayers. 
Future judicial dialogues on the subject matter are also important in harnessing the link between 
constitutional law and tax law. A harnessed relationship between the two branches of law supposes 
that the former lays down sound principles that would enable the latter to acquire its robustness. It 
should be kept in mind that although the MLI is radical in terms of deconstructing the existing 
balanced allocation of taxing rights, this instrument has yet to build solid foundations.61 
15.5 Conclusions 
In the light of the above considerations and in order to answer the question of this paper, an effective 
constitutionality review on the new international tax order initially presupposes the existence of an 
independent state (judicial) body which can perform an objective review on the constitutionality of 
the (ratified) MLI in that state. As for the governments, a review by another branch of state power 
may enhance their authority and legitimacy when implementing the MLI norms in the process of 
domestic tax collections. For the taxpayers, an effective constitutional review will settle their doubts 
on the effect of MLI norms to their basic rights. 
Instead of being prescriptive, this chapter has been discursive. It addresses one of the major 
counteractive international tax measures formulated after the leaks of multiple tax avoidance and 
evasion practices which had taken place within the last decade. In addition to the MLI, the perpetual 
fight against abusive tax practices has recently sought for proposals, most prominently, that of the 
EU and the United Kingdom, concerning the Digital Services Tax. Prima facie, the stake for this 
regime to be reviewed for its constitutionality is higher than that of the MLI, for it prescriptively 
imposes additional direct taxes to certain categories of taxpayers. The latter could potentially lead to 
discrimination and ultra vires taxes issues. Amidst the growing tension between the governments and 
the taxpayers, constitutional courts may find themselves as the necessary arbiter with a significant 
role in fostering the constitutional values vis-à-vis the administration of taxes. 
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